The Indonesian Response Plan to Avian Influenza

This CME-certified monograph presents the proceeding of this international conference below can be read at: www.rosejasperfox.net/PDF/2007INF_SP.pdf

Presented at the Second Annual Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza Conference 2007 which took place 1-2 February 2007 in Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A.

Tri Satya Putri Naipospos, DVM, MPhil, PhD
National Committee on Bird Flu Control and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Jakarta, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

In Indonesia, outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in poultry were first noticed in August 2003. Initial cases were not contained and the HPAI H5N1 virus has since spread progressively to, and is now considered endemic in, 216 districts in 30 out of 33 provinces throughout the archipelago. Since July 2005, of 79 confirmed cases, 61 have been fatal (77% case fatality). Human cases have occurred in 9 provinces, and a high percentage of cases (46%) occurred in cluster.

The government of Indonesia prepared its National Strategic Plan in November 2005, which consists of coordinated animal and human response. Focus has been given to the importance of communications with the public about measures to prevent or reduce the risk of infection and the likelihood of a human pandemic. Besides that, the government has moved to control disease in animals and carried out integrated active surveillance.

The animal response is mainly focusing on improved farm biosecurity, vaccination in infected areas, and selective culling with compensation in endemic areas. Several key implementations that need to be addressed are the phase-out of high-risk farming system practices, improved surveillance and reporting from the commercial poultry subsector, improved effectiveness and feasibility of mass vaccination in the backyard poultry sector, and increased use of culling.

The human response is concentrating on services for treatment and care of HPAI patients in 44 reference hospitals. It also involves preparing for a possible outbreak in the human population and investigating those deaths that have occurred. The surveillance for humans occurs through both routine and additional surveillance activities.

The most important constraints to the control response at the moment relate to limited collaboration between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, the lack of a BSL3 lab, and frequent shortages of laboratory reagents, which limit overall diagnostic capacity.